Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Command, the Department of Defense's supported command for the homeland defense mission, the paper recommends establishing a sub-unified organization under Northern
THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 changed the way the United States of America views its security. Although many Americans understood the danger terrorism poses, the general feeling was that it was a problem outside our homeland. As a result of the attacks on New York City and Washington and the foiled hijacking that ended in a Pennsylvania field, Americans came to the stark realization that international terrorism is now a reality in their own backyards.
The Bush Administration reacted quickly. Within a month of the attacks, it created the White House Office of Homeland Security and charged it with developing and coordinating "the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks." 1 Military forces should play a significant role in securing and defending the homeland.
However, there are legal implications for using military forces in areas usually associated with law enforcement and other civilian agencies. This paper discusses one of the main perceived obstacles to using military forces in the domestic environment, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
(PCA), and shows there is little conflict. Following this discussion will be a short introduction to special operations and America's most specialized forces -its special operations forces ( SOF), whose unique capabilities are important to homeland security (HLS) and homeland defense (HLD).
The paper then examines the National Strategy for Homeland Security and illustrates
areas in which SOF can bring their capabilities to bear while remaining within generally accepted confines for military use within the United States. To understand the Strategy, this discussion uses the U.S. Army War College model for analyzing ends, ways, and means and conducting a feasibility-acceptability-suitability (FAS) test 2 and uses Arthur F. Lykke's, Jr.'s method for assessing risk. 3 Once the paper argues the need to introduce SOF to HLS/HLD, it discusses U.S. Northern Command, the new Unified Command designated the supported command in HLD and a supporting command to other Federal agencies in HLS. Finally, the paper proposes a means to integrate SOF into Northern Command by creating a structure for SOF planning, execution, and command and control in HLS and HLD.
Understanding the definitions of homeland security and homeland defense is important.
"Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." 4 Homeland security is a multiple-partner effort in which the Department Before discussing any use of military forces in the homeland, however, it is vital to understand traditional obstacles to their employment. This paper will now examine the most significant legalities of homeland military use and show that their restriction is more perception than reality.
POSSE COMITATUS ACT OF 1878
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 derives from a traditional reluctance to use military forces in the homeland. The original intent of the PCA was to prohibit the Army from playing a direct role in domestic law enforcement, except as provided by the Constitution or Congress. interests and is beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies.
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There are both exceptions-in-fact and exceptions-in-name to the PCA. Exceptions-in-fact are those specifically allowed by law, as illustrated above. Exceptions-in-name are not specifically delineated by the law but are allowed by common practice or legal precedent.
Regardless, if there is an appearance that the use of military resources may be perceived as violating the PCA, then policymakers must carefully consider potential benefits weighed against possible erosion of the intent of the PCA. The recent trend, however, has been to allow military assistance to civilian law enforcement as long as it is in strict compliance with the Constitution and U.S. laws and under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense.
Using the military must counterbalance the need to maintain the integrity, spirit, and intent of the PCA. Policymakers could argue for using military forces in counterproliferation and consequence management under 10 USC Sec 382 and 10 USC Sec 831 by reasoning that a state of emergency exists in the U.S. with respect to WMD since September 11, 2001 . In this case, it would be prudent to use any readily accessible military capabilities to prevent a WMD or other terror incident in the U.S. homeland.
The intent of the Homeland Security Strategy is to place the responsibility for domestic counterterrorism on the law enforcement sector. Other than the wording of PCA, there appears to be no major impediment to using military forces in a domestic counterterrorism role. Regardless of how they interpret it, policymakers cannot ignore the PCA, nor should they downplay its importance. The framers of the Constitution created the concept of civilian control over the military when they made the President the Commander-in-Chief (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). They gave Congress the authority to "raise and support Armies" 9 (Article I, Section An exception runs the risk of setting a precedent for future exceptions. Continued exceptions erode the effect of the law and can render it useless. Therefore, policymakers must treat every scenario that invokes the PCA as a unique situation and subject it to close scrutiny. Otherwise, they may not only be in violation of the law, but they may also run the risk of eroding Constitutional intent and military readiness and establishing a potential trap for future policymakers.
The U.S. homeland is vulnerable to attack in today's environment. This paper has briefly argued the need for military forces to protect it; it will now discuss a unique military force capable of playing a wide range of roles in homeland security and homeland defense.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Special operations and special operations forces are unique, both in their missions and in their operating arena. Special operations are:
operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with conventional forces or other government agencies. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.
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SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces; rather, SOF enhance the effects of conventional forces . Whether SOF operate independently or with other forces, SOF should be in a role that achieves synergy with the interagency effort that may not otherwise be obtainable.
Inherent to SOF is an ability to provide adaptable military responses in situations requiring tailored, precise, focused use of force in which risks and results are politically sensitive. 13 For SOF to achieve their greatest effects, they must be included from the beginning of the campaign plan. If planned for and used properly, SOF contribute enormously to the plan's desired unity of effort.
Historically, DOD has conducted special operations outside the United States. However, some special operations missions are applicable inside the U.S. SOF have unique capabilities that can contribute in these mission areas, as long as they are integrated into the campaign plan in a complementary role with conventional forces and/or interagency assets. SOF bring a wide variety of capabilities to the defense and security of the U.S. Although traditionally used outside the homeland, SOF's role can translate inside the borders as well.
Regardless of SOF's participation, the only method to maximize their contributions is to integrate them into the Homeland Security Strategy. This way represents the last line of defense for homeland security. Should preventive measures fail, America must be prepared to respond should an event occur so we can minimize the effects and deny terrorists' one of their main goals -disrupting our way of life.
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Among the means the Strategy lists to support this way are: integrating federal response plans into one plan; creating a national incident management system; improving tactical counterterrorist capabilities; enabling seamless communications among responders; preparing for decontamination, planning for military support to civil authorities, and constructing a national training and evaluation system. Implementing this section of the strategy fails the FAS test because it overlooks a valuable asset that resides in SOF -Civil Affairs forces.
Unlike some potential SOF roles, CA would make their greatest contribution after an attack occurs, especially in restoring civil order in the aftermath of a catastrophe. highly experienced judges, lawyers, police, engineers, public works managers, and city administrators. Obviously, many of these specialties are critical to restoring and maintaining civil order and administration in an area suffering the consequences of a catastrophe such as a WMD event. CA forces are ready-made to augment local authorities whose capabilities have been exceeded. As with other mission sets, CA maximize their contribution only if integrated into planning and training for an event before it occurs. However, incorporating CA into this mission does pose some risk. Given ongoing operations overseas that tax CA forces, integrating CA into emergency preparedness and response may require increased force structure unless they contribute only to those situations in which they are most critically needed.
The Homeland Security Strategy superbly outlines the vision for protecting America's homeland, especially since it is the government's first attempt to plan for this massive undertaking. Its ends and ways are comprehensive and appropriate for the Strategy's broad mission. In some cases, the means outlined by the Strategy are suitable as written. In other cases, alternative means based on SOF contributions, as summarized in To re-emphasize, SOF make their greatest contribution only if included early in planning for homeland security and homeland defense. The following sections will illustrate the architecture for effectively integrating SOF into these roles.
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
The idea to create a Unified Command charged with the homeland defense mission surfaced as early as 1997. By 1999, U.S. Joint Forces Command gained responsibility for HLD after Congress rejected the idea to establish a new command. 29 
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SOF IN HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND

DEFENSE.
Defining the role of SOF in HLS/HLD is merely a first step in integrating these forces into the current construct. Understanding USNORTHCOM's command and control (C2) structure is the second step. Figure 1 shows the present USNORTHCOM organizational structure.
Noticeably absent from the organizational structure is a SOF component or a distinct SOF C2 structure.
FIGURE 1: USNORTHCOM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
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USNORTHCOM created an adaptive joint force headquarters (AJFHQ) to balance the competing requirements to establish and maintain a standing headquarters for day-to-day issues and to provide C2 in a contingency. According to USNORTHCOM, AJFHQ:
provides CDR USNORTHCOM with the ability to plan, execute and evaluate mission success in an ever-changing operating environment. The AJFHQ enables command and control of assigned forces through cross-functional collaboration during planning [and] provides CDR USNORTHCOM with the ability to task organize the headquarters to command, control and support joint operations better than the traditional J-code staff.
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Under this construct, it may be possible for USNORTHCOM to provide adequate C2 of SOF during operational training and execution. However, USNORTHCOM makes no mention of this task, and it would not be in accordance with joint doctrine. 
FIGURE 2: THEATER LEVEL SOF COMMAND AND CONTROL
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The TSOC is the theater special operations advisor who exercises operational control of all assigned or attached SOF in theater. Figure 3 shows the TSOC structure in the mature geographic theaters. Noticeably absent is a TSOC for USNORTHCOM. As a result, there should be a sub-unified TSOC under USNORTHCOM. Special
Operations Command Northern Command (SOCNORTH) would fulfill the requirement to establish a C2 structure for SOF that would provide unity of command for SOF in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Assignment of forces to SOCNORTH is neither desired nor required -CDR USNORTHCOM would remain a supported commander, with CDR USSOCOM providing forces in a supporting role. Creating a SOCNORTH headquarters staff would allow CDR USNORTHCOM to perform the following functions as specified by Joint Publication 3-05:
• Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command;
• Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support operations;
• Integrate SOF in the planning process; and
• Match mission capabilities with mission requirements.
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CONCLUSION
Homeland security and homeland defense have long been a major priority of the Federal government, but most of America's wars have been conventional conflicts fought on foreign soil.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 brought a different kind of warfare to America's shores. As a result, the homeland is now a battleground in a war waged against a fanatical enemy using unconventional methods. When battling an unconventional foe, one of the best weapons available is an unconventional force organized, trained, and equipped to defeat them.
This paper introduced the reader to special operations and special operations forces. It analyzed the Homeland Security Strategy and showed how SOF can strengthen the strategy as a means to implement this evolving strategy. It showed how the PCA provides a valuable sounding board for using military forces in the homeland and how decision makers must be careful to balance their need against the potential risk of the military assuming a large role in the homeland. The paper then illustrated how USNORTHCOM lacks a command and control structure to incorporate SOF in homeland defense and homeland security missions. The resulting conclusion was a proposal to create a theater special operations command under USNORTHCOM. SOCNORTH would effectively integrate SOF with conventional forces and interagency assets in protecting and defending the homeland.
Special operations forces have unique mission competencies, particularly in counterterrorism, counterproliferation of WMD, and civil affairs, that will contribute greatly to winning the war in the homeland. The keys to their successful use are to understand their capabilities and how they can contribute to the interagency plan, incorporate them into the force structure and planning from the outset, and to establish an appropriate command and control structure to capitalize on their contributions.
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